Normative arguments against explosion
Paraconsistent logics reject the following inference rule.
Explosion (EXP): P, ~P ⊨ Q.
Such logics are typically packaged with dialetheism-the view that there are true contradictions-but need not be. The dialetheist may endorse EXP if she is willing to countenance the truth of every proposition;
1 and the non-dialetheist may have independent reasons for denying EXP. 2 For example, that conclusions ought to be relevant to premises; e.g. Anderson and Belnap 1975. 2 A popular strategy for defending paraconsistent logics involves raising normative considerations against EXP. Consider this argument.
One ought to believe the logical consequences of one's beliefs. But, in fact, most people have inconsistent beliefs. Supposing EXP (for reductio), it follows that most people ought to believe Q, where Q is any proposition whatsoever. But, for any given person, there is some proposition that she ought not to believe. It follows from the preceding that, for some R, she ought to believe R and ought not to believe R. This is a contradiction. Thus, by reductio ad absurdum, EXP is not a valid rule of inference.
Call this a normative argument (against explosion).
Let the bridge principle in such an argument be the premise that connects logical consequence with normative claims about beliefs. The bridge principle in the above is:
B1: One ought to believe the logical consequences of one's beliefs.
There are at least two serious objections to B1. The first is due to Harman 1984 . Suppose that one's current beliefs have an absurdity as a logical consequence. Then, given B1, one ought to believe the absurdity. But that consequence is false: one ought rather to revise an antecedent belief. The second is due to Broome 1999. Each proposition is a logical consequence of itself. So, given B1, one ought to believe everything that one does in fact believe. But that consequence is false: sometimes one forms beliefs without, say, taking due care as to whether the belief is true.
Building on work by MacFarlane (2004 ), Florian Steinberger (2016 investigates whether there is a successful formulation of the normative argument against explosion by systematically considering alternative bridge principles. He argues not, concluding that 'there is no successful way of reformulating the normative argument' (p. 387).
Steinberger's criticisms are largely successful, but fail for one particular bridge principle. I introduce the bridge principle in §2, respond to Steinberger's criticisms in §3, and argue that the 3 bridge principle can be independently justified in §4. In §5, I sketch an argument, available to nondialetheists, in defence of the corresponding formulation of the normative argument.
I do not aim to show that the relevant formulation of the normative argument is successful: such a conclusion could not be established in a single article. But, nonetheless, I provide a clear strategy for developing it into a compelling case against EXP, at least in the eyes of the nondialetheist. Given that (i) normative arguments have recently received substantial criticism (especially in Steinberger 2016), and (ii) most non-dialetheists endorse EXP, the strategy is important.
The B2-formulation
The bridge principle in question is this:
(Following MacFarlane, Steinberger calls it (Cr+).) Using B2, the normative argument is formulated as follows (Steinberger 2016: 389, 401, 403 As I understand it, the objection is this. Hold S's background beliefs and evidence fixed. Then, B2
implies (1):
(1) If S could believe a set of propositions that entails P, then S has a (defeasible) reason to believe P.
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and (1) entails the implausibly strong conclusion that 'saying that S has no reason whatsoever to believe P is to say that S could not possibly believe any set of propositions that entails P'. Thus, according to Steinberger, B2 is implausibly strong.
I agree that the conclusion-saying that S has no reason whatsoever to believe P is to say that S could not possibly believe any set of propositions that entails P-is implausibly strong. However, I
disagree with Steinberger' (2) If S could believe a set of propositions that entails P, then S does believe a set of propositions that entails P.
However, Steinberger would not be entitled to assume (2). The most plausible defence of (2) appeals to two claims: that S has inconsistent beliefs; and that EXP is valid. (These two claims jointly imply the truth of (2)'s consequent, and thus of (2).) But Steinberger is not entitled to assume that EXP is valid, as this is precisely what is at issue.
The only consequence of B2 in the vicinity of (1) is:
(3) If S could believe a set of propositions that entails P, then S could have (defeasible) reason to believe P.
But (3) is unproblematic. So Steinberger's first objection fails.
The second objection is that B2 is implausibly weak.
[B2] in no way requires of me that I should revise my beliefs in light of their consequences.
Surely, though, logical coherence does demand that I modify my belief set so as to avoid blatant inconsistencies. (Steinberger 2016: 404) 6
This objection presupposes that B2 is intended to capture the normative status of logic. However, this presupposition is not required for the B2-formulation of the normative argument to go through: on the natural reading of (d)-on which 'no reason whatsoever' implies that there is no reason logical or otherwise-there is no equivocation. I return to this point in the next section.
But even if B2 is intended to capture the normative status of logic, the objection fails. As Suppose, then, that I believe P and Q, and learn that P ⟷~Q. Given B2, I have (defeasible) reason to believe each of ~P, ~Q, and ~(P ⟷~Q). Given B3, I have (defeasible) reason not to believe each of P, Q, and P ⟷~Q. These reasons do not themselves tell me which belief(s) I ought to revise, but merely that I have reason to revise my belief set in one (or more) of the prescribed ways.
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What I ought to do is determined by the relative strengths of my other reasons. If I have better reasons to believe Q and P ⟷~Q than to believe P, then I may have overriding reason to revise the belief that P: I ought to cease believing that P and form the belief that ~P. If I have equal reason to believe Q and P, and a better reason to believe P ⟷~Q, then I may have overriding reason to cease believing Q and P (but not to form any beliefs). This is all as it should be: in general, logic alone cannot find the false proposition in an inconsistent set.
So, although B2 on its own might be implausibly weak, it can be supplemented with other bridge principles. For example, together, B2 and B3 generate reasons to revise an inconsistent belief set, thereby avoiding 'blatant inconsistencies'. Perhaps other bridge principles would also be required to fully capture the normative status of logic. Either way, the plausibility of B2 does not turn on its being complete. So Steinberger's second objection fails.
An independent justification of B2
As noted above, however, the B2-formulation of the normative argument goes through regardless of whether B2 captures the normative status of logic. To obtain a contradiction, B2 need merely state that, in the relevant circumstances, S has a (defeasible) reason of some kind to believe Q. Call that the neutral reading of B2.
On the neutral reading, B2 can be independently justified. Consider the following principles:
P1: S is entitled to take the contents of S's beliefs as evidence.
P2: If P is a logical consequence of S's evidence, then S has (defeasible) reason to believe P.
Together, P1 and P2 imply that S is entitled to take herself to have ( The justification of P2 resides in the fact that evidence-based disciplines-the sciences, law, perhaps philosophy, etc.-go so far beyond it. In such disciplines, evidence is typically taken to confer (defeasible) reason to believe a proposition that the evidence merely supports. But it would be difficult to maintain such a claim while denying that we have (defeasible) reason to believe the logical consequences of our evidence. Our use of evidence in forming beliefs about the world, then, appears to presuppose P2. If this is right, then, on a neutral reading, B2 can be independently justified.
A defensible normative argument?
Even if the above considerations are accepted, it does not automatically follow that the B2-formulation of the normative argument is defensible. For there is another premise, (d), which might be false.
I have heard the following argument raised against (d).
If S has inconsistent beliefs and EXP is valid, then, for any given R, R is a logical consequence of S's beliefs. But if R is a logical consequence of S's beliefs then, given how easily (defeasible) reasons can be obtained, S does indeed have (defeasible) reason to believe R. It follows that, for every proposition, S has some reason to believe that proposition. So (d) is false.
Call that the weak-reason argument.
The weak-reason argument straightforwardly fails. It assumes that EXP is valid in order to infer that R is a logical consequence of S's beliefs, which is what makes it plausible that S has
(defeasible) reason to believe R. However, the validity of EXP is precisely what is at issue, so cannot legitimately be assumed.
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To be clear, the specific wording of (d) does not permit the assumption that EXP is valid.
Notice that (d) has the following form:
where P is the proposition that S's set of beliefs is inconsistent and any proposition whatsoever is entailed by it (courtesy of EXP); and Q is the proposition that there are propositions that S has no reason whatsoever to believe. Now, (4) is stated in this way to highlight the fact that Q is intended not to rule out P; but (4) is in fact equivalent to (5):
(5) (If P, then Q) and (if not-P, then Q), which is equivalent to:
So to argue against (4), one can argue: that P is true and Q false; or that not-P is true and Q false; or simply that Q is false. It is insufficient to assume P and argue on that assumption that Q is false.
I will now use these comments to sketch an argument in favour of (d). I reiterate two points.
First, I do not take the following to establish (d): my ultimate aim is not to show that the B2-formulation is successful and that we should therefore reject EXP. I aim to provide a clear strategy for providing a potentially compelling defence of the B2-formulation. Second, the argument in favour of (d) is available only to non-dialetheists. As such, one could straightforwardly resist the argument by endorsing dialetheism. However, for any theorist unwilling to countenance trivialism (the view that every proposition is both true and false), dialetheism would in turn lead to the rejection of EXP.
In light of the equivalence between (4) and (5), one can argue for (d) by defending, for some S, each of the following:
(7) If S's set of beliefs is inconsistent and any proposition whatsoever is entailed by it (courtesy of EXP), then there are propositions that S has no reason whatsoever to believe. Let us consider a case in which S is an ordinary person, Sandy. Suppose that Sandy's beliefs are either jointly consistent, or else they are inconsistent in the following easily imaginable way: she has double-booked herself without (yet) realising it, and believes both that she is going to the theatre on Monday night, and that she is not going to the theatre on Monday night. Moreover, let us suppose there is some proposition R, such that, except perhaps via her contradictory beliefs and EXP: R is not a logical consequence of Sandy's beliefs; Sandy's beliefs do not otherwise tell in favour or against R;
and there are no other (say) practical, epistemic or moral reasons for Sandy to entertain or form a belief about R. For example, perhaps Sandy has no interest in the probability of coin tosses, and no reason to have such an interest, and R is the proposition: that the next coin tossed by the author of the present paper will land heads. Or perhaps Sandy has no interest in the history of Icelandic names or presidents, nor any reason to have such interests, and R is the proposition: that Sveinn Björnsson is a former President of Iceland.
Now, consider (8).
Suppose that the antecedent is true: Sandy's beliefs just happen to be jointly consistent. Then, it seems to straightforwardly follow from our description that Sandy has no reason whatsoever to believe R: her beliefs do not tell for or against R, and she has no other practical, epistemic or moral reasons to believe it. So there are propositions that Sandy has no reason whatsoever to believe. Hence (8).
Turn to (7). Suppose that the antecedent is true of Sandy: her set of beliefs is inconsistent (because of the double-booking) and any proposition whatsoever is entailed by that set (courtesy of EXP). But now, consider a proposition, R, such that the only candidate (defeasible) reason that Sandy might have to belief R is that it is entailed (courtesy of EXP) by her set of beliefs. As before, R might be that the next coin tossed by the author of the present paper will land heads, or that Sveinn Sandy to possess such a reason, it would be generated by a chain of reasoning along the following lines:
(9) Sandy is going to the theatre on Monday night.
Sandy is not going to the theatre on Monday night.
Therefore, R.
By parity of reasoning, the following chain would thus likewise generate an equivalent reason to believe not-R:
(10) Sandy is going to the theatre on Monday night.
Therefore, not-R.
But then, by P3, (10) generates a (defeasible) reason not to believe R. That is: Sandy would have a (defeasible) reason to believe R only in virtue of a chain of reasoning that, by parity of reasoning, would likewise generate an equivalent (defeasible) reason not to believe R. Moreover, as nothing here 8 The argument fails for the dialetheist as, for her, the truth of not-P does not preclude the truth of P.
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relies on the specific details of (9) and (10) We now have a choice. Either we say that Sandy has a pair of (defeasible) reasons-to believe R and not to believe R-that are equal and opposite, generating no resultant reason. (On this picture, neither the reason generated by (9) nor the reason generated by (10) is undermined by the other: both reasons are in play, they merely cancel each other out.) Or we say that Sandy has no (defeasible) reason to believe R, nor (defeasible) reason not to believe R.
Which option should we take? Although there is clearly a conceptual difference between the two pictures, there is, it seems, no practical or epistemic difference whatsoever: Sandy's overriding reasons will be precisely the same either way. So the phenomena do not dictate that we adopt either picture over the other. Nevertheless, in at least three respects, the latter picture is the more natural option. First, it is less cumbersome; the latter picture does not posit pairs of reasons that are superfluous to our understanding of Sandy's situation, and is in that respect more elegant. Second, relatedly, it is potentially problematic to posit equal and opposite reasons that can never come apart, and thus cannot have a practical, epistemic, moral, etc., effect; after all, their practical, epistemic, moral, etc., import is their raison d'être. It is not clear that we are justified in positing reasons that cannot influence how we ought to act or think. Third, notice that in both pictures it will likely appear to Sandy that she has no reason whatsoever to believe R, and no reason whatsoever not to believe R.
This appearance, however, is borne out only in the latter picture. Thus the latter picture is less revisionary, and accords more with first-person experience.
Each of these considerations suggests that, at least to some extent, it is more natural to adopt the latter picture-on which Sandy has neither reason to believe R nor reason not to believe R. Of course, a detailed examination of these pictures would be required to provide a compelling case, and many questions remain. What exactly is it about chains of reasoning like (9) and (10) that means that they generate no reasons as opposed to equal and opposite reasons? Does the conclusion apply to other parallel chains of reasoning that do not invoke EXP? And, while we should expect there to be balanced reasons in at least some cases-such as cases in which the reasons can come apart-, must 14 equal and opposite reasons always be separable? I cannot explore such issues here. But nonetheless we have a clear strategy for arguing that, on present assumptions, we should adopt the latter picturethe picture on which Sandy has neither reason to believe R nor reason not to believe R.
It would follow from the latter picture that, given our description of the case, Sandy does not have any reason whatsoever to believe R: the picture rules out the only candidate (defeasible) reasons.
So, given that picture, there are propositions that Sandy has no reason whatsoever to believe. But that is the consequent of (7). So we have sketched an argument for the consequent of (7) from its antecedent. Hence, we have sketched an argument for (7).
Thus, we have sketched arguments for (7) and (8), and thus for (d). So, as things stand, we should conclude that the B2-formulation of the normative argument is defensible.
Concluding remark
There is a defensible formulation of the normative argument against explosion. I have responded to
Steinberger's objections to that formulation, and sketched defences of two key premises: the bridge principle B2; and the claim that, even if S's set of beliefs is inconsistent and any proposition whatsoever is entailed by it (courtesy of explosion), there are propositions that S has no reason whatsoever to believe.
The arguments herein are not conclusive. But they provide a clear strategy for defending the B2-formulation of the normative argument, available to any non-dialetheist. In light of the recent criticisms levelled at normative arguments, this is important. Further examination is required before we can establish whether or not normative considerations tell in favour of paraconsistent logic.
